Free Riding, Market Structure, and Church Member Donations in South Carolina by Hull, Brooks B. & Lipford, Judy
eviewof 
eligiolls Research 
Official Journal ofthe Religious Research Association, Inc. 
Volume 52, Number 2 December 2010 ISSN 0034-673X 
ARTICLES 
Robert Joseph Taylor, Linda M Chatters, Jacqueline S. Mattis, and Sean Joe 
Religious Involvement among Caribbean Blacks Residing in the 
United States 125 
R. Khari Brown 
Religion, Economic Concerns, and African American Immigration Attitudes 146 
George Yancey 
Who Has Religious Prejudice? Differing Sources ofAnti-religious Animosity 
in tIle United States 159 
Brooks B. Hull and Jody Lipford 
Free Riding, Market Structure, and Church Menlber Donations in 
South Carolina.......................................................................................................... 172 
Gabriel A. Acevedo 
Collective Ritual or Private Practive in Texas: Assessing the Impact of 
Religious Factors on Mental Health 188 
Leslie J. Francis, Patrick Laycock, andAndrew Village 
Statistics for Evidence-based Policy in the Church of England: Predicting 
Diocesall Performance 207 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Richard Alba, Albert J. Raboteau, and Josh De Wind (eds.) 
Immigration and Religion in America: Comparative 
and Historical Perspectives James W. Lewis 
Hans Joas 
Do We Need Religion? On the Experience of 
Self-Transcendence Gary D. Bouma 
123 
FREE RIDING, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND CHURCH 
MEMBER DONATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA* 
BROOKS B. HULL AND JODY LIPFORD 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEARBORN 
REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH 2010, VOLUME 52(2), PAGES 172-187 
The research literature on factors influencing member donations to churches is exten-
sive. This paper uses unique datafrom South Carolina Baptist congregations to con-
firm much of the research, particularly including the potential for free-riding by 
members, but also extends that research by exploring the differential effect on dona-
tions ofcompetition among Baptist congregations and between Baptist and non-Bap-
tist congregations. We employ hierarchical linear modeling, rarely used in religious 
research but particularly well suited to the data, some ofwhich is by congregation 
and some ofwhich is by county. Previous empirical and theoretical work offers con-
tradictory conclusions. We review the theory, clarifying some issues. Our results con-
firm that free riding increases as congregations grow larger, an effect mitigated by 
the increasing level ofservices offered as congregations grow. Importantly, compe-
tition between Baptist congregations reduces and competition with non-Baptist con-
gregations increases per member donations. 
T
he research on factors influencing member donations to churches is extensive. This 
paper uses unique data from South Carolina Baptists congregations to confirm much 
of the research, particularly including the potential for free-riding by members. In 
other words, this paper incorporates as causal factors important internal member charac-
teristics and motivations that are the focus of previous research, especially the potential 
temptation by members to free-ride on other member contributions. Importantly, it also 
extends previous research by exploring the differential effect on donations of competition 
among Baptist congregations and competition between Baptist and non-Baptist congrega-
tions. That is, this paper examines the effects of external market structure and competitive 
pressure on donations. By focusing on the differential effect of Baptist and non-Baptist 
competition, we address a largely unexplored issue, acknowledged by Chaves and Gorski, 
"that there probably is more competition among congregations within denominations than 
there is across denominations" (2001 :77). As an additional contribution, this paper employs 
hierarchical linear modeling, rarely used in religious research but particularly well suited 
to the data, some of which is compiled by congregation and some by county. 
A significant body of research shows that member donations to churches are positively 
affected by such internal factors as member income, intensity of belief, and commitment 
or involvement in the particular church (Davidson and Pyle 1994; Finke, Bahr, and Schei-
tie 2006; Hoge 1994; Hoge and Yang 1994). Member donations are also positively affect-
ed by internal factors including age, education, doctrinal strictness, conservatism, and 
congregational stewardship programs including pledge systems (Inskeep 1994; Luidens 
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and Nemeth 1994; Olson and Perl 2005; Sn1ith and Everson 2008; Zaleski, Zech, and Hoge 
1994). This in1portant body ofresearch tends to yield similar statistical results, results also 
consistent with theory. Researchers have found less comn10n ground exploring the possi-
bility that donations are negatively affected by the number of congregation members-the 
free rider problen1. G"iven the disagreement, a more detailed examination of the issue is 
appropriate. 
THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM 
The effect the number of congregation members has on individual donations is a com-
plex issue, although theory tends to suggest an inverse relationship. The potential for free 
riding by church members was first analyzed by Wallis (1991). Churches produce products 
that have public goods characteristics to a greater or lesser extent. Church doctrine itself, 
for example, typically is a public good that is available without cost or restriction even to 
non-believers. Church gatherings-Christian or Jewish Saturday or Sunday services, Mus-
lim prayer services-provide collective benefits to all attendees and typically involve no 
entry fee. For such goods as these, members are tempted to avoid contributing. 
Free riding is also a potential problem to the extent church members provide one anoth-
er valuable services for free. Here an obvious temptation exists for an individual to solicit 
valuable services from other members but not reciprocate. A free rider can also exploit 
whatever social network or personal attribute signaling church membership provides, dilut-
ing the value to others of those same goods. 
The notion that some kinds of organization face free rider problems predates its appli-
cation to religion, of course. Olson (1965) first raised the issue of public goods produced 
by groups. Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) and Comes and Sandler (1986) provide overviews 
of the literature, which makes the general prediction that total voluntary donations to organ-
izations providing significant public goods will grow as the organization's membership 
grows, but individual voluntary donations will shrink, holding other factors constant. This 
same literature suggests a key strategy to mitigate the free rider problem is for the organi-
zation to provide unique and valuable private goods jointly with the public good, a strate-
gy most effective when the organization has a monopoly on the private good or when the 
private good cannot be provided separately from the public good (Sandler 1992). 
As well as providing valuable private goods jointly with collective religious goods, 
churches have at one time or another pursued several other strategies to mitigate the free 
rider problem. One oft-used technique is establishment: the church is funded by the state 
through involuntary taxation. In some nations, formerly in Scandinavian nations for exam-
ple, established church membership was automatic at birth. While assuring financial secu-
rity, established churches often suffer from low levels ofmember commitment, free riding 
in another guise, as Adam Smith (1979 [1784]) first noted about England's established 
church. Hamberg and Pettersson (1994) confirm the result for contemporary Sweden, 
although this result is not without challenge (Bruce 2000). 
Church doctrine itself often addresses the potential for free riding with coercion. That 
is, church doctrine mandates donations of time or money to the church or on behalf of the 
church. These behavior standards are enforced by a method unique to religion: reward or 
punishment in the afterlife. What is more, monitoring is perfect. God is watching each mem-
ber all the time. The key disadvantage to this strategy is that enforcement is only effective 
at reducing free riding by those who believe in that portion of the church's doctrine. 
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Ofcourse, another strategy is simply to exclude free riders. Wallis (1991), for example, 
suggests that what he terms "exclusive" churches pursue this strategy, while ·"inclusive" 
churches accept the burden of free riders. Exclusion as a strategy is not without problems. 
Free riders must be identified, not always an easy task, especially for larger churches, and 
especially while at the same time avoiding excluding "cheap riders," those who make pos-
itive but modest contributions. A related strategy would be for a church to employ multi-
ple smaller congregations, within which free riders can more easily be identified, implying 
a possible limit on the optimal size of congregations within a denomination. 
In a seminal paper, Iannaccone (1992) describes how the strategies of sacrifice and stig-
ma can reduce the free rider problem. Here members are required to engage in some cost-
ly behavior, behavior that is unusual and unique to the church's members. An example of 
the latter is a requirement that members dress in unique clothing. Sacrifice and stigma serve 
as both selection devices and signaling devices. The high cost (sacrifice and stigma) of 
membership discourages free riders, and the unusual behavior singles out members for easy 
identification by menlbers and non-nlembers in the larger community. While sacrifice and 
stigma are effective, they tend to work best for smaller groups, such as cults. The high cost 
of nlembership tends to linlit nlembership potential. In addition, if membership increases 
sufficiently, unusual behavior or dress ceases to stigmatize. 
Regardless of the strategy churches might employ to reduce free riding, the weight of 
theory still suggests the degree ofa free-rider problem will be inversely related to the num-
ber of church members. However, at least two factors mitigate the negative effect of free 
riders on a larger church's ability to prosper financially. First, larger churches might have 
lower per member cost because of economies of scale (Stonebraker 1993). If so, free rid-
ers are a less significant burden for larger churches. Second, the larger number ofmembers 
might in itselfbe valuable. Each nlenlber gains from others' membership. Iannaccone (1992) 
terms this effect "participatory crowding." More generally, this is an example ofa network 
externality, a concept Liebowitz and Margolis review (1994). Because an increase in the 
value of a collective good increases the tendency of individuals to provide support for the 
collective good, larger churches might expect more support from members to the extent 
nlenlbership creates a network externality. 
In summary, a review of the theory of the free rider problem as it relates to church-
es yields nlixed results. Churches face a free rider problem to the extent church goods 
are purely collective. However, churches have available several tools to reduce free 
riding, including jointly providing unique valuable non-collective products, establish-
ment, coercion, and sacrifice and stigma. In addition, the free rider problenl is poten-
tially mitigated by economies of scale and by the presence of a network externality in 
membership. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the empirical research on the subject offers mixed results. In 
support of the free rider problem, Hoge et ale (1996) find a weak inverse relationship 
between denomination size and donations per member. They also note that members of 
local congregations tend not to nlake donations to their associated national churches and 
national church initiatives. Similarly Zaleski and Zech (1992) find that larger congrega-
tions receive lower per-merrlber donations. By contrast, Lipford (1995) finds no evidence 
of a free rider effect on nlenlber donations based on extensive data from three Protestant 
denominations, although these results are not free ofcriticism (Tullock 1996; Zaleski and 
Zech 1996). 
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RELIGIOUS COMPETITION 
Economists and sociologists of religion have for some time studied the relationship 
between religious market structure and measures of church nlembership and intensity of 
belief. Two major competing lines of argument have enlerged. The first follows from the 
sociology literature on secularization, arguing that increases in denominational variety or 
pluralism fracture the religious landscape and weaken churches (Breault 1989a, 1989b). 
By contrast, the "rational choice" or "supply-side" nlodel of religion argues that unregu-
lated competing churches are compelled by market forces to mobilize their members, mem-
bers who are motivated by preferences for religious goods that are similar in significant 
ways to ordinary goods (Stark and Finke 2000). To prosper in a competing religious mar-
ket, churches must evangelize and offer a mix of religious products that appeal to mem-
bers.Consequently, a pluralistic religious environnlent generates higher levels ofcommitment 
from a larger total number of members than occurs in a monopolistic religious market. 
Researchers focus on at least three reasons for the success of a pluralistic religious mar-
ket: absence ofthe government regulation that often enforces an inefficient monopoly reli-
gious market, evangelistic effort required for success in a competing religious market, and 
the increased market penetration due to increased religious product variety in a competi-
tive religious market. 
The first and second reasons follow Adams Smith's analysis of the established Church 
ofEngland's failure to motivate members, especially when compared to such "upstart sects" 
as the Methodists, whose clergy were compelled to be attractive to potential members in 
order to survive. Sociologists Finke and Stark have published a substantial body of research 
contrasting regulated monopoly religious markets (established churches) with unregulated 
competing religious nlarkets (Finke 1997; Finke and Stark 1992). Iannaccone (1991) uses 
data across Protestant western countries to support this view. Other contributors, especial-
ly to the regulation versus competition argument, include Chaves and Cann (1992), Ian-
naccone, Finke, and Stark (1997), and the aforementioned Hamberg and Pettersson (1994). 
Iannaccone also contributes an excellent comprehensive review ofthe literature (1998). In 
related work, Olson (2008) and Hill and Olson (2009) look at factors affecting small ver-
sus large congregations, concluding that the higher turnover in smaller churches means 
members are more committed to the congregation. 
The debate between these various camps has been heated at times, often centering on 
questions about the reliability ofdata and interpretation ofhistorical religious behavior (Bruce 
1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Chaves and Cann 1992; Hoge 1996; Finke and Stark 1989; Olson 
and Hadaway 1999; Phillips 1999; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Sorting through these argu-
ments, even in cases where writers clainl to disagree, a consensus emerges that government 
establishment of a monopoly religion (over time) results in a church much less able to attract 
committed members than in an unregulated religious market, although Hull and Moran (1999) 
present an example of successful establishment in colonial New England. 
On the other hand, disagreement renlains about the role product variety plays in a reli-
gious market separate from any governnlent regulation. That is, does religious product vari-
ety increase total church membership and conlmitment? Given that economists have examined 
market behavior for the last two hundred years, an obvious route to a solution would be to 
appeal to economic theory and to argue that religious markets are like ordinary markets. If 
so, we need only examine the economic theory of product variety to predict behavior in 
religious markets. 
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Unfortunately, there is no unambiguous answer to this question in the economics liter-
ature on product variety. Most ofthat literature examines issues not relevant here. The pio-
neering work on product variety by Mead (1974) and Spence (1976), for example, tries to 
determine whether competitive markets produce the optimal variety of products, not the 
effect ofproduct variety on total market penetration. Standard texts in industrial organiza-
tion devote significant time to the study ofproduct differentiation, especially its close rela-
tionship to advertising (Waldman and Jensen 2001), but also draw no firm conclusions. 
Competition can produce valuable product variety, but 
variety is not always a good thing. Wholly apart from the cost savings attainable 
through longer production runs, there are cases in which standardization serves con-
sumers better than diversity. The adoption of common technical standards for records 
and compact discs, so that any product can be played on any manufacturer's audio 
equipment, is one example. (Scherer and Ross 1990). 
The possibility consumers prefer some degree of standardization rather than preferring 
unconstrained product variety is a more recent addition to the economics literature; work 
by Church and Gandal (1992) and Besen and Farrell (1994) are examples. Here again, the 
n10dels tend to focus on the optimal degree ofproduct standardization and product variety 
rather than predicting market penetration. Nevertheless, the notion that in some cases con-
sumers prefer competition among standardized products offers an insight that might be use-
ful in studying religion. As Hull and Bold (1998) show, consumers ofreligion, like consumers 
in many ordinary markets, might find religious product variety appealing so long as that 
variety is constrained within a standardized doctrinal framework such as the Ten Com-
n1andments. A classic example in ordinary markets is personal computers, whose sales 
expanded dramatically only after introduction of the IBM PC's standardized open archi-
tecture, which was copied by what became a large number of competing manufacturers. 
Even Stark, a proponent ofthe theory that religious diversity leads to greater total church 
men1bership, acknowledges that a monopoly religion can be valuable to individuals in some 
cases (Stark and Bainbridge 1987:95) and that too much religious diversity can hurt reli-
gion in general: 
it seems to me that by the first century the empire had developed excessive plural-
ism- ... faced with this array, people are likely to have been somewhat overwhelmed 
by their options and therefore to have been somewhat unwilling to stake very much 
on any given cult" (Stark 1996: 197). 
Consistent with this possibility, Hull and Bold (1998) find an inverse relationship between 
church membership and denominational variety using ecological data from U.S. counties. 
In apparent contrast, Zaleski and Zech (1995) find a positive relationship between church 
member donations and denominational variety using data from a number ofProtestant and 
Catholic congregations. 
Importantly, however, most of this substantial literature focuses on the relationship 
between market structure and total membership (or member commitment), not on the rela-
tionship between market structure and member giving. While there is doubtless a connec-
tion between commitment and giving, the link between market structure and giving is 
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implied but rarely studied directly. Further, the literature also does not address directly the 
effect of competition between producers of similar versus dissimilar products. 
SOUTH CAROLINA BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS 
These questions about free riding and market structure make an available set of data 
about Baptist churches in South Carolina very useful. The South Carolina Baptist Con-
vention 2001 Annual Report includes membership and budget data for 1,982 congregations, 
virtually all of the Baptist congregations in the state. The report also includes for each con-
gregation Sunday school attendance and men1bership in selected special programs. 
Here we can analyze a relatively sn1all, standardized religious n1arket. Baptist church-
es dominate South Carolina's religious market. Roughly 2,000 of 5,522 congregations, rep-
resenting well over half oftotal church members in South Carolina, call themselves Baptist. 
Most of these are members of the Southern Baptist Convention. Especially important for 
our purpose, the Southern Baptist Convention is not a centralized organization. Member-
ship in the Convention by congregations is voluntary. Individual congregations have a fair 
amount of latitude about doctrinal detail and complete latitude about associated progran1s. 
In addition, a central authority does not restrict the entry ofpotential members. Thus, South 
Carolina's churches compete in an unrestricted religious market with a significant an10unt 
of doctrinal standardization across at least the Baptist congregations. 
The religious market in South Carolina is not homogeneous across the state, however. 
Significant variation in Baptist and non-Baptist market share exists across South Caroli-
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for South Carolina Counties 
(N = 46) 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
NUMBER OF BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS 5 176 42.9 
NUMBER OF NON-BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS 10 267 75.3 
NUMBER OF ALL CONGREGATIONS 18 449 91.7 
PERCENT OF BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS 16.7% 64.90/0 40.2% 
TOTAL ADHERENTS, ALL CONGREGATIONS 2702 217660 75213.2 
COUNTY POPULATION IN 2000 9958 379616 146626.2 
ADHERENTS PER 1000 POPlTLATION 270.5 660.6 499.4 
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na's forty-six counties, for example, as does the extent of church market penetration. As 
Table 1 shows, Baptist congregations in a county represent a maximum ofalmost 65% and 
a minimum of 17% oftotal county congregations. A maximum of661 per thousand people 
and a minimum of 271 people per thousand are members of any church in a county. 
Significant variation also exists among Baptist congregations throughout the state. The 
reported congregation membership varies from 6 to 5,940. Total reported congregation 
receipts varied from zero to almost seven million dollars. Minimum receipts per menlber 
were again zero and maximum receipts per member almost four thousand dollars. The rea-
son why some congregations report zero members or report zero receipts could not be deter-
mined. Since this might be a reporting issue, these congregations are omitted from the 
subsequent regression analysis. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for South Carolina Baptist Congregations 
(N = 1,830) 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
TOTAL CONGREGATIONS MEMBERS 6 5940 403.1 
TOTAL CONGREGATIONS RECEIPTS ($) 0.00 6,739,523.00 259,334.14 
RECEIPTS PER MEMBER ($) 0.00 3,986.99 579.78 
HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODEL 
The South Carolina annual report data, plus additional data from government sources, 
allows us to construct a regression equation with congregational donations per member as 
the dependent variable. Independent variables include total congregation members, enroll-
ment in congregation activities, median per capita personal income in the congregation's 
county, number of Baptist congregations in the county, and number of non-Baptist con-
gregation's in the county. The coefficient on total congregation merrlbers should capture 
the free-rider effect, and the consensus of research suggests it should be positive. Enroll-
ment in activities is the total of enrollment in five possible congregation official activities: 
Sunday school, Disciplineship Training classes, Music Ministry, Woman's Missionary Union 
missions education, and Men's Ministries leadership training. This variable serves as a 
proxy for valuable associated products provided to a congregation, and its coefficient should 
be positive, thus at least partially offsetting losses from free riders. Based on previous 
research, per capita personal inconle should affect per member donations positively. The 
number of Baptist and non-Baptist congregations are measures of two types of competi-
tion: the nunlber of Baptist congregations measuring competition from similar products 
and the number ofnon-Baptist congregations measuring competition from different or "non-
standardized" products. Note here that the number of Baptist congregations includes only 
menlbers of the South Carolina Baptist Convention. Breakaway Baptist congregations are 
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counted as non-Baptist. This is an artifact of the data, but is consistent to the extent break-
away congregations adopt doctrine significantly different from Convention member con-
gregations. Regardless, since virtually all Baptist congregations are members ofthe Convention, 
inclusion or exclusion of breakaways should have little effect on the results. 
Because ofpotential reporting issues, we exclude congregations with fewer than twen-
ty-five members and congregations with zero total donations. Additional observations have 
missing data, leaving 1,770 observations in the sample. 
Although seventeen hundred or so congregations are represented in the regression data, 
most of the independent variables are by county, and South Carolina only has forty-six 
counties, reducing the real variation in the independent variables. That is, some of the data 
are hierarchical: donations depend in part on county characteristics, which in tum are influ-
enced by several county-level independent variables. 
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), also labeled multi-level analysis, is an extension 
ofordinary least squares regression analysis. Hierarchical linear modeling allows variation 
in a dependent variable to be analyzed at multiple hierarchical levels, rather than in a sin-
gle level as with ordinary least squares. Like ordinary least squares, in HLM, a dependent 
variable is influenced by several independent variables. However, unlike ordinarily least 
squares, some observations of the dependent variable share a common value for two or 
more ofthe independent variables. These observations ofthe dependent variable are grouped; 
they are part ofa hierarchy. For the South Carolina data, donations are influenced by income, 
for example, but income is only available by county. Thus some of the observations ofper 
member donations share a common value for income, since they come from a given coun-
ty. HLM overcomes the fact that such hierarchical data violates the requirement in ordi-
nary least squares that error terms be independent. 
In this paper, the hierarchical model takes the following form: 
Yic = /30 + /31 Total Congregation Members (level one, congregation variable) 
+ /32 Activity Enrollment (level one, congregation variable) 
+ /33 Personal Income (level two, county variable) 
+ /34 Baptist Congregations (level two, county variable) 
+ /35 Non-Baptist Congregations (level two, county variable) 
+ bOi + cic 
Where: Yic is donations per nlember in county i and congregation c 
/30 is the overall average intercept 
/3 is a slope coefficients on an independent variable 
bOi is the intercept for the equation on county i 
cic is the error for county i and congregation c 
Note: bOi ~ N(0,cr2boi) and cic ~ N(0,cr2) 
The coefficients on the independent variables in this hierarchical model have the same 
interpretation as in ordinary least squares. Because some of the independent variables are 
hierarchical, the slope terms are calculated across congregations and also by county. In 
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other words, the model calculates least squares regression estimates for the independent 
variables within each county where the slopes terms or coefficients are assumed to be iden-
tical across counties. The nl0del then calculates a separate intercept term (bOi) for each coun-
ty's regression. Imagine a set of parallel regression lines, one for each county, where the 
intercept for each county differs because of the level two county variables. /30 is the over-
all average intercept for all counties. The reasoning is quite similar to that used when dunlnlY 
variables are included in ordinary least squares regressions. The coefficients on dunlnlY 
variables cause the regression line to shift up or down. Table 3 sumnlarizes the results. 
TABLE 3 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Per Member Donations 
(N = 1,770, excludes congregations with fewer than twenty-five members and zero donations) 
Unstandardized t Sig. 
Coefficients 
Constant 344.4 4.51 .000 
ACTIVITY ENROLLMENT 0.26 12.49 .000 
PERSONAL INCOME 0.008 2.09 .042 
TOTAL CONGREGATION MEMBERS -.227 -7.82 .000 
BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS -.907 -2.83 .011 
NON-BAPTIST CONGREGATIONS 0.816 2.78 .009 
Dependent Variable: PER MEMBER GIVING 
The regression results are in part expected and in part intriguing. As should be expect-
ed, congregation members donate more to congregations with larger enrollments in special 
programs. Members ofcongregations with such programs donate 26¢ for each person enrolled 
in those programs. Also expected, increases in member income lead to increases in dona-
tions, albeit modest ones. Members donate about a penny more for every dollar increase in 
county personal income per capita. 
The regression results support the presence of a free rider problem. As the number of 
members increases, donations per menlber fall. Each new member reduces per member 
donations by about 23¢. This result is consistent with Finke's (1994) overview of changes 
in the Southenl Baptist Convention in recent years. However, since relatively large con-
gregations remain viable, congregations might be experiencing economies of scale and so 
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have lower costs per member. Larger congregations also have more and larger additional 
programs, increasing the value of a large congregation to its members. Large congregations 
might also benefit from network externalities. The data do not allow us to distinguish these 
possible effects. 
The intriguing results are for the effect of additional congregations on donations to a -
given denomination. As the number of other Baptist congregations in a county increases, 
donations per member to a given Baptist congregation fall. By contrast, as the number of 
non-Baptist congregations in a county increases, donations to a given Baptist congregation 
rise. Taking these results at face value, we would conclude that an increase in Baptist com-
petition reduces member commitment and an increase in non-Baptist competition increas-
es Baptist member commitment. 
The problem with explaining variations in donations by variations in merrlber commit-
ment is that it lacks any connection to economic theory other than ascribing changes in 
merrlber behavior to changes in tastes and preferences. At least as a starting point, we pre-
fer to make the assumption that people's underlying preferences do not change. People's 
behavior changes, but does so because of a change in external circumstances, not because 
of a change in underlying preferences. 
But if individual preferences are not changing, what explains the regression results? The 
second result, that non-Baptist congregations increase Baptist per-member donations, is 
easily explained. Consider a community that adds a second congregation different from the 
first existing congregation, representing a different denomination. The second congrega-
tion will attract some members of the first congregation and some individuals who were 
not merrlbers of any congregation. The members who leave the first congregation will be 
those least committed to it. As a result, the average level of religious commitment of the 
remaining members of the first congregation will increase even though the level of com-
mitn1ent of each member has not changed. What sort of members will the second denom-
ination attract? It will first attract those individuals who find the first congregation to be 
least attractive and the second congregation most attractive. Combined, average measured 
level of religious commitment in the community with two congregations will be higher than 
average commitment in a community with one congregation, even though underlying indi-
vidual preferences have not changed. Research by Stoll and Petersen (2008) is consistent 
here as is work by Olson (2008) and Hill and Olson (2009). Obviously an additional nec-
essary (and reasonable) assumption to deal with our South Carolina data is that member 
commitment and donations are positively correlated. 
What about the effect of additional Baptist congregations on member donations? What 
seems reasonable to us is that non-Baptist congregations compete mainly by such product 
characteristics as doctrine, rather than mainly by price. By contrast, Baptist congregations, 
given they have such similar doctrinal characteristics, mainly compete by price (especial-
ly since entry is not restricted). That is, they attract members by making membership eas-
ier. If so, an increase in the number ofBaptist congregations will result in lower per member 
donations. -This would explain the first regression result. 
Another possible explanation is an extension of the free rider problem from one con-
gregation in an area to all congregations in an area. As the number ofBaptist congregations 
increases, the total number ofBaptist members increases. Because the total number ofBap-
tist members has increased, the free rider problem causes donations per Baptist member to 
fall. Again, our data do not allow us to determine the exact effect. 
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
The regression results are not without potential problems. Multicollinearity exists between 
the number of Baptist and non-Baptist congregations in a county. More populous counties 
have more ofall types ofcongregations. Multicollinearity might be an issue with other vari-
ables as well. However, a review of multicollinearity diagnostics not shown here reveals 
no critical problems. In addition, the key regression results are robust to different selec-
tions of independent variables. Results also were not affected when the specification includ-
ed non-linear regression with membership squared as an independent variable. 
As with any regression equation, our choice of independent variables nlight be ques-
tioned. For example, our measure of competition is a simple count of denominations in a 
county. Might a better measure be some sort of concentration ratio where larger compet-
ing churches have a stronger weight in the equation? We believe conlpetition even from 
very small congregations can be significant and so prefer our measure. In the market for 
personal computers, for example, Apple surely has a significant effect on the behavior both 
of Microsoft and the manufacturers of personal computers even though Apple's personal 
computer market share is only about 5%. In the religious marketplace, surely there are 
examples of relatively small congregations generating significant attention in a region. 
Regardless, we ran regressions using a Herfindahl index as a measure of competition and 
the results did not differ meaningfully from those shown here. 
Competition for member donations might come from outside the religious market entire-
ly. Certainly individuals face innumerable alternative uses for income. Our regression equa-
tion does not capture this form of competition. A potential, albeit not entirely satisfactory, 
proxy for non-religious competition might be county population. Population would repre-
sent available alternatives to church attendance. However, regression results were unaf-
fected when county population was included and the explanatory value of the equation did 
not improve. 
An additional potential problem is that the regressions rely in part on county church 
membership data gathered by the Glenmary Research Center in its Religious Congrega-
tions & Membership in the United States 2000 report. Finke and Scheitle (2005) point out 
that the Glenmary data underreport both the number of congregations and church nlenl-
bership, particularly for historically African-American congregations. By including these 
congregations, they suggest total church membership in South Carolina is actually close to 
66% rather than Glenmary's 48% estinlate. Finke and Scheilt calculate adjustment factors 
for each state and suggest these could be used to make adjustments for each county's total 
membership. They do not suggest a technique to adjust the number ofBaptist and non-Bap-
tist congregations, however. Further, it is not clear to what extent the presence of histori-
cally African-American congregations affects behavior ofmembers of congregations in the 
South Carolina Baptist Convention, who historically have been white. 
Ordinary least squares regression results typically include a nleasure of explanatory 
value of the entire equation, such as the adjusted R-Square statistic, and a measure of the 
statistical significance of the equation, such as the equation's F statistic. One way to eval-
uate the hierarchical regression in this situation is to compare estimates of covariance from 
the full model with estimates of the covariance from a null version of the model where 
county is the only independent variable. These calculations are derived using data from 
Table 4. 
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TABLE 4: ESTIMATES OF COVARIANCE PARAMETERS, FULL AND NULL 
MODELS 
Full Hierarchical Model: 
All Independent Variables Including County 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Residual 121410.8 4116.850776 
Intercept Variance 28.222914 593.853996 
Null Hierarchical Model: 
County is only Independent Variable 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Residual 134176.9 4557.042705 
Intercept Variance 3306.686504 1512.888504 
We can use variance estimates of the intercepts above to calculate the usefulness of the 
full model county intercept terms as follows: 
(1 - (28.222914/3306.686504)) = 0.9915. 
The full model explains about 99% of the between county variation (variation in intercept 
terms between county regressions). Although this seems impressive, additional analysis 
reveals there is little variation in the county intercept terms. Looking at the null model vari-
ance estimates and comparing intercept variance to total variance (the sum ofresidual and 
intercept variance) yields the following: 
3306.686504/(3306.686504+134176.9) = 0.024 
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Thus only about 2.4% of the total variability is between counties when there are no pre-
dictors in the model. In other words, county intercept terms are not very different from one 
another. The full hierarchical model explains a large portion of the variation between coun-
ty intercept terms, but county intercept terms vary little. 
We can use the variance estimates of the residuals from the above table to calculate the 
usefulness of the full nlodel regression slope coefficients as follows: 
(1 - (121410.8/134176.9)) = 0.095 
The full model explains about 9.5% of the within county variation. This is similar in con-
cept to the R2 in an ordinary least squares regression. The full model explains only a mod-
est portion ofthe variation between congregations in counties, although the portion explained 
is statistically significant. As an aside, ordinary least squares regression with these data 
yielded very similar results. 
CONCLUSION 
Our unique set ofdata on eighteen hundred South Carolina Baptist congregations allows 
us to explore two issues: the importance of"free riding" in church nlembership and the roll 
of competition from Baptist and non-Baptist congregations in member donations. Previ-
ous empirical and theoretical work offers contradictory conclusions. We review the theo-
ry, clarifying some issues. Our empirical work is based on membership and donation data 
for the eighteen hundred Baptist congregations in the state. Results suggest free riding 
increases as congregations grow larger, an effect mitigated by the increasing level of serv-
ices offered as congregations grow. Competition between Baptist congregations reduces 
per member donations, an appropriate conclusion ifBaptist congregations compete by price. 
Competition with non-Baptist congregations increases per member donations, logical to 
the extent less-committed Baptist members are more likely to defect to the non-Baptist 
competitors. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 








SCBC Annual Report: 
BEA: 
Glenmary: 
Total church receipts divided by total members. Calculated from 
SCBC Annual. 
Total number ofmembers listed on membership roles. Includes mem-
bers who no longer reside in the area. Source is SCBC Annual. 
Total of enrollment in five possible congregation official activities: 
Sunday School, Disciplineship Training classes, Music Ministry, 
Woman's Missionary Union missions education, and Men's Min-
istries leadership training. Calculated from SCBC Annual. 
Per capita median personal income by county. Source is BEA. 
Number of Baptist congregations in the county. Calculated from 
SCBC Annual Report. 
Number ofnon-Baptist congregations in the county. Calculated from 
Glenmary. 
South Carolina Baptist Convention 2001 Annual: Reports and Min-
utes ofthe 181st Annual Session, Columbia, South Carolina, Nov. 
13-14, 2001. CopYright, 2002. 
United States Department ofCommerce, Bureau ofEconomic Analy-
sis, May 6, 2002 (Web site: http://www.bea.gov/). 
Jones, Dale E. et ale Religious Congregations & Membership in the 
United States 2000. Nashville, Tennessee: Glenmary Research Cen-
ter, 2002. 
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